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Abstract
This paper presents an approach to formal require
ments specication of embedded systems The specic
demands of a specication for command and control
systems are addressed The proposed method allows
various views of a system like conventional methods
The added value lies in the fact that the relationship
between the views is specied formally and consistency
between views can be analyzed formally As a case
study we develop and analyze a formal requirements
specication for a subsystem of a realistic command
and control system Specication and verication are
carried out using the language and proof checker of
PVS
  Introduction
Command and control systems The general task
of a command and control system is to support a team
of operators in monitoring and controlling the envi
ronment in order to accomplish a mission Commonly
these systems support tasks like navigation observa
tion communication defense and training
Command and control systems are equipped with
various sensors and actuators Measurements from
the environment are continuously obtained via the sen
sors and compiled into an abstract picture that reects
the current state of the environment This picture is
communicated to the team of operators The system
supports the decision making process by tracking dif
ferences between the perceived state and the required
state and by proposing and analyzing corrective ac
tions These actions are then planned by assigning a
timeframe and sucient resources and executed via
the actuators
Command and control systems are typically large
and complex whereas the standards on correctness
reliability and availability are high Hence it is a di
cult and errorprone task to build such systems
Needs It is important to be able to manage the
time and costs needed to develop a particular system
Too often fatal errors are detected on testing a system
that has been built already In that case parts of the
development must be reiterated which results in addi
tional and usually unpredictable costs Of course the
damage of errors detected after delivery is even more
disastrous encompassing severe economical as well as
social aspects So it is preferable to detect errors at
an early stage of the development process viz in the
requirements specication phase
Errors in the specication can also be detected by
analysis but this requires that the specication is pre
cise and unambiguous Because informal specica
tions which are written in natural language and il
lustrated by diagrams tend to be ambiguous and im
precise we think that a formal specication helps to
detect errors early
Analysis of formal specications however is very
time consuming Formal methods are cost eective
for systems of industrial size under certain conditions
only Firstly tool support is needed to make the anal
ysis less labour intensive Secondly formal specica
tions must be modular modiable and extensible in
order to allow for an iterative development of the spec
ication Finally as argued by  formal methods
can only be cost eective if the resulting products are
reused
On the other hand  argues that formal speci
cation is essential for the success of reusing software
components so this is another motivation for research
on formal specication
Goal The goal of our research is to compose a
method for formalizing and analyzing requirements
specications of command and control systems and
to evaluate this method on a realistic system
Our approach The good properties of informal
specications should be maintained especially their
readability and the possibility to have dierent views
of the same system like in eg OMT 

In order to maintain readability we propose to
interleave the formal and informal specication by
means of a literate specication style To get a well
structured specication we follow the conventional
approach of presenting dierent views of a system
viz the information function and controlmodel
Having dierent views is an advantage especially if it
is clear how the various models interrelate It is in
dicated how consistency between these models can be
formally stated and veried This is possible because
we express the various models in the same formal lan
guage
To evaluate our approach we formally specied and
analyzed the requirements for a subsystem of a real
istic command and control system The requirements
are derived from existing command and control sys
tems We used the formal language and proof checker
of PVS  For the presentation of the literate speci
cation we used a tool developed for literate program
ming viz noweb 
Section  forms the main section of this paper A
general approach for the formal specication and anal
ysis of requirements is developed The case study is
presented in Section  Finally we will evaluate our
approach on the basis of the case study in Section 
The latter also mentions some related work
 Formal requirements specication
We will distinguish two activities specication and
analysis of the requirements These activities interact
in an iterative process such that analysis leads to a
specication of enhanced quality
The specication of the requirements consists of
building three views or models the information
function and controlmodel The information model
describes the static aspects of the system whereas the
function and control model describe the behavior In
the function model the various operations on the state
are dened The control model species the actual in
teraction with the system and the order in which the
operations occur in response to the input In Sec
tion  we describe these views in more detail
For the analysis we distinguish between verication
and validation By verication the intrinsic quality of
the specication is addressed Special attention will
be given to the verication that the various views t
together It cannot be veried however whether the
intended system has been specied because there is
no authoritative document against which the speci
cation can be checked this check is the purpose of the
validation by domain experts Section  addresses
both aspects of analysis
 Language and form of the specica
tion
In order to relate the various views there must be
one underlying formalism For this reason we have
chosen to use the same language for all models This
can be weakened by using dierent languages that are
translated to a common underlying formal framework
The second approach is followed by 
This language must be expressive enough to model
the various views In order to nd a lot of mistakes
automatically we prefer a language with a strong typ
ing discipline  in the sense that every expression must
have a unique type Finally the language must be
supported by tools in order to make the analysis of
the specication practical
We propose to develop a literate specication This
means that informal and formal requirements are in
terleaved Intermediate documents also contain a list
of unsolved questions An additional advantage of a
literate specication is that it allows to circumvent the
rigid order imposed by formal languages The speci
cation can now be presented in a topdown way
 Specication of the models
Information model The information model de
scribes the static part of the specication It can be
seen as an abstraction of the global state of the sys
tem In command and control systems the informa
tion model describes the abstract picture of the envi
ronment
Typically the information model consists of a num
ber of entities together with certain relations between
them A number of constraints can restrict the set of
allowed states These constraints specify the invariant
properties that the state should have For each entity
its attributes are specied by declaring their names
and the range of values they can take Attributes can
have special properties such as being optional
Function model The function model denes the
manipulations that change the state These manip
ulations can be seen as a relation between succeeding
states The manipulations carry additional arguments
representing the input to the system Only when the
system is deterministic the manipulations can be de
scribed as functions
Control model The control model species the
interaction of the system for example as the set of
valid sequences of atomic actions We focus on input
actions The interaction protocol induced by the set
of valid input sequences represents the assumptions
about the environment
In addition the control model species how the in
put actions trigger the manipulations dened by the
function model In this sense the control model de
nes in which order the manipulations shall be per
formed It also indicates the initial state
Relationship between the models We have in
troduced three models the information model the
function model and the control model We see these
models as complementary
The function model describes possible manipula
tions on states The manipulations are also con
strained by the information model because the result
ing state must satisfy the constraints of the informa
tion model as well Together these models form an
abstract data type a data structure with a set of op
erations
The control model makes this abstract data type
into an abstract state machine The allowed states
are dened by the information model The accepted
input is dened by the control model The input events
trigger transitions between the states as dened by the
function model
 Analysis
Verication We show how consistency and inter
nal completeness can be veried With consistency we
mean that no contradictory requirements are given A
necessary condition is that the various views are com
patible  they allow a common system Another nec
essary condition is that the specication is logically
consistent  falsum is not derivable A specication
is internally complete if it deals with all cases that
can be foreseen by inspecting the specication This
means among others that to any expected input there
is some specied next state However we dont re
quire that this state is deterministically specied as
opposed to 
First of all it must be checked whether the speci
cation is wellformed which can be done by parsing
and typechecking This already reveals a lot of poten
tial inconsistencies In many typed formal languages
typecorrect theories containing denitions only  thus
excluding axioms are even logically consistent
The second possibility of verication is proving pu
tative theorems  These theorems can be seen as
new requirements or as challenges to the specication
The condence in the specication is raised by proving
that they already follow from the specication
It must also be proved that the various views are
compatible ie dont put contradictory requirements
This is checked by proving that a system satisfying all
requirements exists By proving that the initial state
satises the constraints we have a witness that the
information model in isolation is consistent To show
that the information and function model are compati
ble we prove that for every state  satisfying the invari
ants and every input  satisfying some precondition
there exists a next state in accordance with the re
quirements of both the information and the function
model In order to show that the control model is
compatible with the other models we translate this
precondition into assumptions on the input It must
then be proved that the control model guarantees that
these assumptions indeed hold
Note that also internal completeness is addressed
by this analysis since for any valid input there is some
response
Validation Validation aims at making sure that the
specied system corresponds to the desired one It is
mainly the task of the domain experts The proposed
method supports validation of both informal and for
mal requirements because a wellstructured literate
specication is developed Hence the information can
be accessed easily
The formal specication can be validated by inspec
tion This is possible because the informal require
ments serve as explanation and documentation of the
formal specication This part of the validation en
sures that the formalization has been carried out cor
rectly
The validation of the informal requirements is sup
ported too The central point here is the questionnaire
The attempt to formalize requirements forces one to
address ambiguities and incompleteness This usually
requires additional information from the domain ex
perts A second source of questions is the formal ver
ication of the specication Failure of typechecking
and nonprovability of putative theorems often indi
cate errors
According to the answers to these questions the in
formal andor formal requirements are updated This
leads to an improved version of the requirements spec
ication
 Specication and analysis of track
joining
We illustrate our method for formal specication
by a case study As an example we selected a compo
nent of command and control systems related to track
joining We rst briey present the general problem
statement of track joining   Then we describe the
language and tools that were used   The speci
cation and analysis of the requirements along the lines
of Section  is presented in Sections 	
Using our method the specication was derived
from existing  informal requirements specications
for track joining Below we cite from the literate spec
ication that we developed Rather than presenting
a polished nal result we report on an intermediate
stage and show how analysis can lead to an improved
specication
 Automatic track joining
A track is a description of a realworld object re
porting on eg measured position velocity accuracy
etc Tracks occur on  at least two levels
 Sensor tracks as reported by a sensor
 Tactical tracks as presented to the operator
An object in the real world may be detected by var
ious sensors Since sensors are not perfect this results
in slightly dierent sensor tracks In order to present
a global and coherent picture various sensor tracks
should be joined into a single tactical track if they
represent the same realworld object One of the tasks
of Tactical Track Management  TTM is to derive and
maintain the set of tactical tracks
Precisely one of the sensor tracks that are joined to
a particular tactical track  viz that with the highest
accuracy is responsible for reporting on the current
position velocity and other attributes of the tactical
track
The various sensors can initiate new sensor tracks
and update or wipe existing sensor tracks this is the
input to the system TTM has no output actions In
stead an abstract picture is built containing the cur
rent sets of sensor and tactical tracks and the join
and responsibility relations between them A similar
assumption on systems is made in 
 PVS and noweb
In order to carry out the case study a particular
formal language has to be chosen To support the
case study mechanically certain tools must be present
We used PVS  Prototype Verication System  as
a specication language equipped with an interactive
proof checker and noweb  as a literate specication
tool
PVS language The language of PVS is based on
classical higherorder logic This means that quanti
cation over functions sets and properties is allowed
leading to a great expressive power The logic is
equipped with a type system PVS has a rich variety
of types eg numeric types  nat and real enumer
ated types  fredwhiteblueg pairs  natbool
functions  realnatreal subtypes  fxnat
p	x
g record types   namestring agenat 
and a scheme for dening abstract data types such as
 recursive trees
A large library contains denitions of many general
concepts like lists sequences induction etc
PVS system A specication is parsed and type
checked by the PVS system Due to the typing rules
 especially subtyping it is undecidable whether a the
ory is typecorrect To overcome this the typechecker
generates typecheck conditions  TCCs that are suf
cient for typecorrectness
Theorems raised by typechecking or by the user
can be interactively proved in the proof checker The
user repeatedly applies the rules of higherorder logic
in order to simplify the goal to be proved until it is
trivial This process is partly automated by builtin
strategies like term rewriting and decision procedures
for linear arithmetic and propositional logic
Noweb We use noweb as a literate specication
tool  In combination with L
A
T
E
X noweb yields type
set text and PVS code The PVS code can also be
extracted in order to formally analyze it
PVS theories are split in chunks which can be pre
sented in any order These chunks have labels and can
refer to each other In the case study presented in the
next sections text in typewriter font is PVS code
The italic parts between angled brackets are hhlabelsii
 Information model
The information model describes the static struc
ture and the invariant properties of the track database
Using conventional methods the informal specication
can be expressed by an ERdiagram as depicted in Fig
ure 
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Figure  ERdiagram for track joining
The diagram introduces two kinds of entities  sensor
and tactical tracks and two relations between them
 the join and responsibilityrelation The numbers
on the edges indicate cardinality constraints on the
hhtdbpvsii 
trackdatabase THEORY
BEGIN
hhTrack denitionsii
Datastructure TYPE 
 stracks setofSenstrack
ttracks setofTactrack
join predSenstrackTactrack
resp predSenstrackTactrack

XY VAR Datastructure
hhConstraint denitionsii
TDB TYPE  fX  constraints	X
g
END trackdatabase
Figure  Topmost specication of track database
relations eg a sensor track is responsible for at most
one tactical track
Other types of constraints are usually stated in
accompanying text like the constraint that a sensor
track can only be responsible for a tactical track if it
is joined to it Typically a data dictionary denes the
attributes of the entities and the types of the various
attributes
Formalization of the track database The track
database is formally specied in two steps First we
dene a data structure which roughly indicates what
the database looks like Then the constraints are de
ned as predicates on this data structure A track
database  type TDB is then dened as a data struc
ture that satises the constraints
The topmost part of the formalization is displayed
in Figure  This part corresponds to the ERdiagram
without the constraints The data structure is de
ned as a record containing sets of sensor and tac
tical tracks and the responsibility and joinrelations
between them  represented as predicates on pairs
The conjunction of the constraints forms a predicate
on the data structure In Figure  we present some of
the constraints The rst constraint expresses that
a responsible primitive track must be joined to the
corresponding tactical track The second one expresses
a cardinality constraint in the ERdiagram in Figure 
every sensor track is joined to exactly one  indicated
by exists tactical track Finally constraint three
states that track numbers are unique
Entities Figure  illustrates the denition of sensor
and tactical tracks The types and the attributes of the
tracks are dened respectively Note that we declared
identity as optional The type optionalt is an
hhConstraint denitionsii 
sss VAR Senstrack
t VAR Tactrack
constraint	X
bool  FORALL st
resp	X
	st
  join	X
	st

constraint	X
bool  FORALL s
stracks	X
	s
  exists t join	X
	st

constraint	X
bool  FORALL ss
stracks	X
	s
  stracks	X
	s
 
number	s
number	s
  ss

constraints	X
bool 
constraint	X
  constraint	X
  
Figure  Constraint denitions
hhTrack denitionsii 
Source TYPE
Sensnumber TYPE
Identity TYPE 
ffriend hostile pending joker fakerg
Kinetic TYPE   pxpyvxvy real 
Maxaccuracy nat
Accuracylevel TYPE 
fxnat    x  x  Maxaccuracyg
Senstrack TYPE 
 number Sensnumber
source Source
identity optionalIdentity
kinetics Kinetic
accuracy Accuracylevel

Tactrack TYPE  
Figure  Types and attributes of tracks
abstract data type with type parameter t we omitted
its denition The elements of optionalt are either
none  absent or one	x
 where x is of type t
 Function model
The function model introduces the manipulations
that change the track database The external manipu
lations consist of creating updating and wiping sensor
tracks Only a crosssection of the specication of the
manipulations will be given As an illustration we con
sider the requirements related to the creation of a new
sensor track into the track database Requirements for
the other external manipulations are dened similarly
Informally the requirements can be stated as fol
manipulations THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING trackdatabase
hhdenition of distance critii
hhdenition of determine respii
hhdenition of new tac trackii
noconflict	ididIdentity
bool TABLE
id id pending friend hostile

pending  TRUE  TRUE  TRUE 
friend  TRUE  TRUE  FALSE 
hostile  TRUE  FALSE  TRUE 
ENDTABLE
joincriteria	st
bool 
distancecrit	kinetics	s
kinetics	t


 noconflict	identity	s
identity	t


joinsenstrack	s
	XY
 bool 
EXISTS t
ttracks	X
	t

 joincriteria	st

 LET ZX WITH joinadd		st
join	X


IN determineresp	t
	ZY

newsenstrack	s
	XY
bool 
LET ZX WITH stracksadd	sstracks	X


IN joinsenstrack	s
	ZY

OR newtactrack	s
	ZY

END manipulations
Figure  Part of the function model
lows If a new sensor track is inserted it shall be ver
ied whether it can be joined to an existing tactical
track This must be done according to two criteria
 the distance between the two tracks is within a
specied margin
 the identity of the tracks is not conicting  as de
ned by the table in Figure 
If a tactical track satisfying these criteria exists the
new sensor track is automatically joined to it and the
responsibility relation is updated accordingly Other
wise a new tactical track must be created
Note that this description refers to internal manip
ulations like joining a sensor track to a tactical track
creating a new tactical track and determining the re
sponsible track The various manipulations can be for
malized in a rather straightforward manner Part of
the formal function model is illustrated in Figure 
In the denition of new sens track	s
 s is added
to the sensor tracks in state X resulting in an inter
mediate state Z Note that s has not been joined to a
tactical track so Z doesnt satisfy constraint This
is repaired in the nal state Y by either joining s to
some existing tactical track or by creating a new tac
tical track and joining s to it  the specication of the
latter manipulation is not shown here
The relationship join sens track	s
	XY
 holds
if sensor track s is joined to some existing tactical
track t satisfying the join criteria In that case the
pair 	st
 is added to the join relation and the re
sponsible track is redetermined  which is not further
specied in this paper Whether identities are non
conicting is dened by a table a PVS construct that
is tested for completeness automatically as explained
in Section 	
	 Control model
The task of the control model is to dene the inter
action between the  subsystem and its environment
In this case study this boils down to dening the valid
sequences of input actions We rst dene the atomic
actions as an abstract data type with elements of
the form new	s
 update	s
 and wipe	s
 for some
sensor track s In all cases the function arg returns
the sensor track s The PVS theory containing the
control model starts with the following declarations
ijk VAR nat
input VAR sequenceactions
The input to TTM is represented by a sequence of
actions Thus input	i
 denotes the i
th
action and
arg	input	i

 the corresponding sensor track
A predicate present	input
	si
bool  sensor
track s exists after i actions of the input have oc
curred can be dened as follows At some point ji
a track with ss number is initiated and it is not wiped
for any jki The predicate valid	input
bool
holds if all newly initiated tracks are not present but
all updated and wiped tracks are
The control model is linked to the information
and function model by dening an initial state and
a nextstate relation The initial stateTDB con
tains an empty set of sensor and tactical tracks
The higherorder function next state mapping ac
tions to the corresponding relations in the function
model is dened such that eg next state	new	s


 new sens track	s
 Using these denitions we can
dene state	input
	i
	X
bool which is true of a
state X if it is reachable from the initial state by per
forming the rst i input actions

 Verication
Typechecking The rst formal check on the speci
cation concerns typecorrectness PVS detects a type
error in the theory representing the function model
 cf Figure  no conflict expects arguments of type
Identity but in the denition of the join criteria
it gets arguments of type optionalIdentity This
leads to a question for the domain experts how the
no conflictcriterion is to be interpreted in case iden
tities are absent
Recall that typechecking may introduce typecheck
conditions We show one of the TCCs automatically
generated by PVS that needs careful consideration
noconflictTCC OBLIGATION FORALL id id
id  pending  NOT joker	id

This TCC reveals an omission in the specication It
is due to the fact that the TABLE dening the predicate
no conflict  cf Figure  is not exhaustive the rows
and columns of joker and faker are missing PVS
wants us to prove that these cases never occur This
obligation cannot be fullled the specication has to
be amended by extending the table
Consistency between views We now show how
consistency between the various views can be stated
and proved From now on XY only range over TDB
ie data structures satisfying the constraints
XY VAR TDB
As indicated in Section  compatibility of a ma
nipulation with the information model is stated by the
formula FORALL Xs EXISTS Y R	s
	XY
 This
formula expresses that in any state X satisfying the
constraints the transition R with input s can be per
formed leading to some state Y satisfying the con
straints However this doesnt hold for the manip
ulation new sens track adding a track with an ex
isting number violates constraint which expresses
that numbers are unique We are forced to think about
the necessary precondition for this manipulation We
now get the following which can be proved with some
eort in the PVS proof checker The lemmata and the
orems below are translated to their universal closure
implicitly
precond	Xs
bool 
NOT EXISTS s
stracks	X
	s
  number	s
number	s

infofuncompatible LEMMA precond	Xs
 
EXISTS Y newsenstrack	s
	XY

Of course it must also be shown that assuming the
precondition is justied This is done by proving that
given valid input  in the sense of the control model
the assumption can be proved Formally this is stated
as follows  If after i actions of valid input we get a
new	s
 action in state X then the precondition holds
precondjustified LEMMA valid	input
 
new	input	i

  state	input
	i
	X

 precond	Xarg	input	i



After doing the same analysis for the other manip
ulations we can prove that for valid input the system
is always in some specied state The theorem below
can be proved by induction on i The base case holds
since the initial conguration satises the constraints
The induction step uses that the manipulations are
compatible with the information model
viewscompatible THEOREM valid	input
 
EXISTS X state	input
	i
	X

 Concluding remarks
Evaluation The case study showed us that our ap
proach has certain benets but also that certain im
provements are still needed We mention some benets
of our approach
 Already the attempt to formalize brought about
a lot of good questions and conceptual clearness
 Type checking automatically found forgotten
cases in the denition of tables functions etc
 The control model forced us to give a clear bound
ary of the system Note that the function model
doesnt make clear that join sens track is an
externally invisible manipulation
 The invariants of the information model are a
means to control the system integrity In the case
study for instance moving the join criteria to
wards the information model would imply that
they always hold not only when the join
manipulation is performed
 The verication of compatibility between views
forced us to think about the assumptions made
on the environment This led to the introduction
of preconditions
Note that a formal analysis not only uncovers vari
ous errors early but in the end we have a guaran
tee that the specication is nonambiguous internally
complete and logical consistent and that the various
views are compatible
The case study also revealed that certain improve
ments are needed
 Technically the combination of PVS and noweb
is inconvenient The PVS system works on the
extracted code so feedback  eg type errors is
directed to this code instead of to the source
le Similarly since noweb generates the out
put it is not possible to use the L
A
T
E
X pretty
printer of PVS Also graphical notations like
OMTdiagrams 
 should be supported by the
literate specication tool
 More emphasis should be put on the control
model Also output actions have to modeled and
sequences of actions are not expressive enough in
general although they were sucient in this case
study
 A clearer view is needed on the exact tests that
should be performed in the analysis This should
result in a clearer description of internal complete
ness and consistency
Future work Eventually our research should lead
to a systemwide formal specication of command and
control systems resulting in formal development The
following issues still have to be addressed
 Systemwide specication Other typical subsys
tems of command and control systems must be
tried eg the execution of corrective actions
Moreover special attention must be paid to the
composition of various components Until now
only views of the same component are supported
 Nonfunctional requirements Important issues
like realtime requirements graceful degradation
robustness and availability of the system are not
yet dealt with
 Optimization Criteria Optimization criteria oc
cur frequently in command and control systems
It is not easy to formalize that a system should
usesatisfy such criteria The criteria themselves
can be stated of course but note that in general
we cannot require that a system nds the optimal
solution Similarly as signaled by  mere pref
erences  as opposed to requirements are hard to
formalize
Related work We refer to  for an overview of in
dustrial applications of formal methods In the papers
below similar work is reported as in our paper
A requirements specication for an aircraft collision
avoidance system is given in 	 A single statebased
model is constructed in that paper written in RSML
 Requirements State Machine Language This model
expresses the blackbox behavior of the system Sev
eral formal properties of the specication are automat
ically veried in 
In  formal methods are used for specication
design and verication of an air trac control infor
mation system In that paper ERdiagrams and data
ow diagrams are translated into state and operation
specications in VDM  Concurrency requirements
are modeled separately We share many of the authors
ndings concerning specication
A formal requirements analysis for an avionics con
trol system can be found in  PVS is used there
to formulate functional and safety requirements It is
formally veried whether the functional requirements
satisfy the safety requirements
Acknowledgments We like to thank Dieter Ham
mer for his stimulating contribution to our project dis
cussions and his comments on this paper
References
  EM Clarke and JM Wing Formal methods State
of the art and future directions ACM Computing Sur
veys 	

 
  B Dutertre and V Stavridou Formal requirements
analysis of an avionics control system IEEE Trans on
SE 	 
  A Hall Using formal methods to develop an ATC in
formation system IEEE Software 	 
 
 MPE Heimdahl and NG Leveson Completeness
and consistency in hierarchical statebased require
ments IEEE Trans on SE 	 
  CB Jones Systematic Software Development using
VDM Prentice Hall nd edition 
  NG Leveson MPE Heimdahl H Hildreth and
JD Reese Requirements specication for process
control systems IEEE Trans on SE 	



  B Meyer The next software breakthrough IEEE
Computer 	
 
  S Owre JM Rushby N Shankar and F Von Henke
Formal Verication of FaultTolerant Architectures
Prolegomena to the Design of PVS IEEE Trans on
SE 	 
  N Ramsey Literate programming simplied IEEE
Software 	 

  J Rumbaugh M Blaha W Premerlani F Eddy and
W Lorensen ObjectOriented Modeling and Design
Prentice Hall Englewood Clis 
  JM Rushby Formal methods and their role in the
certication of critical systems Technical Report
CSL CSL 
  JM Spivey The Z Notation A Reference Manual
Prentice Hall nd edition 
  P Zave and M Jackson Where do operations come
from Amultiparadigm specication technique IEEE
Trans on SE 	 
